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ABSTRACT
Purpose:
The purpose of this paper is to identify and describe various factors for understand-
ing criminal behaviour involved in phishing and to provide advice – in the areas of 
security, criminal procedure, and victimology.
Design/methodology/approach:
The project combined several qualitative and quantitative techniques such as inter-
views and surveys, as well as content analysis. 
Findings:
Several categories of subjects were identifi ed: those who are aware of some scien-
tifi c achievements in this fi eld and who feel increasingly apprehensive about the 
disclosure of private information; those who are not prepared to readily incorporate 
scientifi c progress in similar fi elds; the third category includes staff members who 
do not embrace all new measures in the fi ght against this type of cybercrime. The 
participants could also be categorized on the basis of their inclination to recognize 
new forms and types of phishing: some are aware of new forms and can recognize 
them as soon as they emerge locally; others cannot do so. 
Research limitations/implications:
To allow fi ndings to be generalized, future research should include measures that 
could specify additional means to be used by members of a wider representative 
group, such as tools, materials, educational and course modules, implemented dur-
ing training. 
Practical implications:
This research represents a useful source of information for method implication in 
combating phishing schemes, and for detecting new emerging forms and types of 
cybercrime promptly, as well as new social engineering methods to facilitate it.
Originality/value:
This paper should be of particular interest to forensic specialists, in the analysis of 
crime scene behaviour and of methods phishers use in luring their victims. 
Keywords: Phishing, Spear Phishing, Pharming, Cybercrime
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1 INTRODUCTION
Phishing schemes (The term term was fi rst used by Gercke, Đokić, Radulović, 
Petrović, Lazović & Prah (2008:147) and in Nikolić‚ Gvozdenović, Radulović, 
Milosavljević, Jerković, Živković, Živanović, Reljanović, & Aleksić. (2010:30), in 
Serbian literature, and in the world term was fi rst used in 1996. according to 
Jakobsson & Myers (2007:3)) are currently the most prevalent manifestations 
of cybercrime phenomena. Types and phenomenology of this type of crime are 
evolving on a daily basis, as does the sophistication of its perpetrators, so re-
search in this area is extremely important. The importance of such research lies 
in the phenomenological mapping of manifested forms in order to solve crimes 
in the area. This paper aims to create a map of the present state of affairs of 
this area in Serbia. Focal groups are experts who deal with cybercrime, especially 
electronic crime. The aim of the research is to present the characteristics, varia-
tions, and interdependence of various elements in phishing and spear phishing 
schemes. The most secure way to achieve this was to investigate specifi c expert 
knowledge and judgements in this area by means of surveys and interviews. 
2 THE SURVEY
The key objectives of this study were:
To examine phishers’ behaviour, MO, and signatures from expert points of view; to 
understand the relationship between victims’ actions, their jobs, current positions, 
and connected jurisdictions; to discover how and why perpetrators fi nd, lure, and 
catch specifi c victims; and to fi nd out what perpetrators do with the obtained per-
sonal data, thereby mapping the route and destination of such stolen data.
2.1 Sample and methodology
The total sample includes 20 experts in four different fi elds: the judiciary, bank 
security personnel, the police, and the public prosecutor’s offi ce. Their expertise 
lies in the fi eld of cybercrime but in separate areas. This fact helped us acquire 
more precise study results.
Interviews and surveys were conducted on the same day in June 2010. Each sur-
vey lasted for 10 minutes while each interview lasted for 15.
In reviewing this report, please note that percentages may vary or did not add 
up to 100 %, due to rounding, the existence of multiple answers to one or more 
questions, or the exclusion of any “not sure” or “decline to answer” responses.
This initial research implemented Delphi research methods; during the interview 
participants were introduced to the dispersal of answer percentages so that they 
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could predict answers to the interview questions more precisely. It was conducted 
among attendants of the “Credit and debit cards in 2010“conference held in Bel-
grade, and organized by the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. Participants were 
from different sectors, such as bank e-security, the police hi-tech crime unit, judges, 
and public prosecutors specialized in e-crimes. The number of survey participants 
was twenty (n=20). Each participant was asked to take an anonymous survey, with 
a brief description of its content, goals and methods used. Everyone was asked not 
to give or disclose any personal information and was informed that, if anybody 
did, that information would be lost in the process. If they wished to see the results 
of this survey l participants were asked to contact its organizers of by mail; they 
would get a copy of the results and analysis upon its completion. Researchers ex-
plained in the addendum to the survey that any participant was free to give more 
than one answer, and where possible, to give a different answer from that given 
in the survey, specifi c to the participant. The participants were informed about the 
aims and goals of the survey and broader research project of phishing typology, of 
which the given surveys and interviews formed part.
3 THE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
With respect to the question: “Do you consider phishing more dangerous than 
other forms of cybercrime?” participants of the survey were ambivalent; half 
considered phishing to be the most dangerous among other forms of cyber 
crimes, while the other half ( i.e. 50 %) thought it not to be as dangerous, or no 
more dangerous than other cybercrimes (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Danger level of the phishing
The reasons for believing phishing to be not so dangerous could be found in the 
global action to suppress the phishing phenomenon, while the other result was 
probably due to the real danger of the phenomenon itself (Smith, Grabosky & 
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Urban, 2004). This result may stem from awareness-raising campaigns against 
phishing in Serbia, focusing on the banking sector, together with action against 
and strategic preparedness for this and other types of cybercrime. Regarding the 
behaviour of perpetrators, this could mean that participants are not very focused 
on behavioural analysis, but much more interested in the phenomenology of 
the issue. In analyzing their responses, we could distinguish two types of partici-
pants: those who underestimated the phishing issue, and those who did not.
With respect to another question regarding what types of phishing were most 
common in their everyday life, 92.3 % of all survey participants replied that 
the most common phishing schemes were in English language, and only 7.7 % 
thought that they were in Serbian (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: The most common phish for everyday life
This question and answers to it revealed for the fi rst time the presence of 
phishing schemes in poor Serbian language in this geographical area. This 
could mean that perpetrators tend to cover this geographical area, because of 
its signifi cance in terms of economic resources but also because of its poten-
tial role in spreading the business of organized criminal groups in this area. 
One explanation could be the use of PoC honeybots or other automated bot 
systems, and online free translation tools such as Google Translate or others, 
to socially engineer their scheme. This result could also be read as a victi-
mology analysis, where the targeted victims were not just English-speaking 
people in Serbia, but also Serbian victims not speaking English language. This 
is very alarming, and provides valuable feedback for the phishing campaign, 
especially regarding awareness of Serbian language (poorly crafted, but fully 
functional) phishing schemes in this area. The dissemination of answers, with 
the vast majority confi rming English language phishing schemes, still confi rms 
the perpetrators’ tendency to use mass mailing and bot systems, rather than 
focused attacks, such as spear phishing. But the other group certainly revealed 
the existence of such attempts in this area.
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Most participants distinguished spear phishing (83.3 % of all answers) from 
common phishing scheme, but nevertheless 16.7 % of participants considered 
the two to be the same (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Differentiation of phishing types
Again, this could be interpreted as resulting from anti-phishing campaigns, but 
could stem from existing daily phenomena in business life in Serbia: phishing 
mail, targeting CEOs and other high ranking offi cials in well-led businesses as 
well as state offi cials. 
Figure 4: Qualifying spear phishing
This question alone indicated the existence of spear phishing and its possible im-
plications in Serbian cyberspace. One could deduce that this area is therefore no 
exception, and that soon spear phishing mails may result in successful fraud, re-
sulting in CEOs and other offi cials giving away valuable professional and private, 
even personal, information to phishers. One can speculate that, with poorly craft-
ed phishing schemes in Serbian language – probably made with bots and DDoS 
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attack engines, organized, educated expert perpetrators could craft very attractive 
spear phishing schemes aimed at higher CEOs and other VIPs, which could result 
in acquiring everything – from digital IDs to well-kept company secrets.
The question: “do you consider spear phishing to be a modern type of phish-
ing?” resulted in 8.3% affi rmative answers, while 16.7 % did not consider it to 
be a modern variation, but just a separate type of phishing scheme. The vast 
majority (75 % of all participants) considered spear phishing to be an upgraded, 
precise and vicious type of phishing (Figure 4). This result could be due to mas-
sive bulk mail attacks, present in Serbian cyberspace, most prominently in the 
banking sector, from which the majority of participants came. This also answer 
the question of which sector is most vulnerable to this type of attack, although 
the diversity of answers also indicates a wrong understanding of the phishing 
phenomenon itself. Just 10% of participants did not distinguish between spear 
phishing and classic phishing, while the remaining 90% had different specializa-
tions in categorizing its modern elements. 
Figure 5: The most common type of cybercrime
The most common type of cybercrime, present in common business life and 
encountered by cybercrime law enforcement agencies in Serbia, involves phish-
ing schemes, as stated in 76.9 % of participants’ answers. This is followed by 
spear phishing, pharming, and spimming, each accounting for 7.7 % (Figure 5). 
Although this also revealed the existence of pharming and spimming attacks in 
Serbian cyberspace, the overall result very accurately positioned the existing and 
growing problems of phishing and spear phishing. All of this indicates that future 
strategic, tactical, and operational measures should be taken by the government 
and policy makers. Of course there must be deeper thorough scientifi c research 
in this area before any action is taken in the fi eld, but hopefully this research 
could give some guidelines for future research. The most interesting fact is that 
Serbian legislation does not actually specify incriminating acts that would cover 
activities like phishing and spear phishing, pharming or spimming. 
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Figure 6: Various types of identity theft
The participants considered various types of identity theft (even virtual identity 
theft) intended to cause material damage to somebody (14.3 % of all answers) 
or to obtain some kind of unlawful material gain for the perpetrators or others 
(71.4 % of all answers), or fi nally having trade or sale as the ultimate motive for 
the ID theft (14.3 % of participants) (Figure 6). One could argue that in a coun-
try that has not incriminated ID theft offenders there are serious implications. 
Nevertheless all survey participants confi rm that there must be some knowledge 
about the phenomenology of ID theft, its motivation, and outer manifestations. 
This is therefore an opportune time for the analysis of phishing and other types 
of ID theft within Serbian cyberspace.
Figure 7: Purpose of middlemen
Another question was: “Is it possible, according to your knowledge, that per-
petrators often hire middlemen in the perpetration and realization of such 
crimes?” Here a large percentage of participants, 63.6 %, responded that per-
petrators do hire fraudulent collaborators (Petrović, 2004) as money mules to 
handle money or goods gained through phishing; 18.2 % of the participants 
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did not perceive perpetrators as an organized group of men or women, but as 
solitary ‘gunmen’ acting alone. Another 18.2 % of participants perceived per-
petrators as people using other people as guinea pigs for their quests (Figure 
7). The vast majority of answers (81.8 %) showed that all of these acts contain 
a common element involving systematization, implicating the existence of or-
ganized crime in this area.
The responses to our next question required engaging the professional and 
personal experience of the participants. We found that 7.7% regarded phishing 
schemes as too naive, poorly crafted fi shing hooks, which could not lure a real 
fi sh, and therefore not a real phishing victim; 23.1 % of the participants found 
them relatively naive judging by their general and overall characteristics; 15.4 
% found them subtly perfi dious, while the vast majority (46.3 %) thought them 
extremely dangerous, especially spear phishing schemes (Figure 8).This result 
could be due to real danger arising from phishing and spear phishing (accord-
ing to the largest group) but there still appears to be a signifi cant percentage 
of survey participants who underestimate this phenomenon in Serbian cy-
berspace. Surprisingly, despite offi cial awareness-raising campaigns, the group 
who consider phishing to be naive could be infl uenced by further preven-
tion-awareness campaigns by law enforcement offi cials. One of the answers 
was open and referred to the focus group. In the participants’ opinion, older 
citizens were more vulnerable than others, especially since their “pride and 
experience” are likely to be targeted by the phishers, as well as their naivety 
concerning URL difference.
Figure 8: The level of sophistication
The next question was: “Do you consider social networking as a future cyberspace 
fi eld for the realization of phishers’ schemes?” Interestingly, the vast majority of 
participants (78.6 %) considered it to be ideal for future phishing schemes, and 
7.2 % of the participants thought that social networking sites already provide a 
fertile fi eld for phishing schemes. 
The level of sophistication
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Figure 9: Social networking as future fi eld
A small percentage of participants (7.1 % ) found Cloud computing to be more real-
istic virtual space for phishing and more recent forms of cybercrime (Figure 9). This 
distribution of results shows that phishers are seriously present in social networking 
today, but that more danger comes from contemporary and modern types of com-
puting applications on the web. It also shows that there is very high awareness of 
fraud problems in Serbian cyberspace among bank and police personnel
The last question showed that participants (84.6 %) regarded bank clients as the 
most vulnerable group with respect to phishing attacks. CEOs of banks and busi-
ness fi rms were regarded as targets by 7.7 % of participants, while 7.7 % thought 
that the target group comprised uneducated persons with important positions 
in the state i.e. those not familiar with fraudulent online trade, gaining personal 
and other data for ID theft (Figure 10).
Figure 10: The most endangered group for the phishing attacks
Besides the survey questionnaire, some participants were also interviewed so 
as to address the problem in depth, in order to create a model to explore the 
phenomenon of phishing. In the course of informal conversation, experts were 
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asked their opinions and shared their experiences in the fi eld, in order to create 
a practical and useful model. In all interviews, ignorance and a false belief in the 
security policy of their institution combined with a misplaced feeling of full se-
curity was identifi ed: the minority of participants were aware of some scientifi c 
achievements in this fi eld, with growing fear of breaches of private information 
in any fi eld; the vast majority felt confi dent about their security capabilities and 
the legal apparatus to deal with cybercrime issues, and were not prepared to 
readily incorporate scientifi c progress in similar fi elds; one section of the inter-
viewed group were employees who did not readily embrace all new measures 
in fi ghting this type of cybercrime. Those categories also could be sub-divided 
according to their recognition of new forms and types of phishing schemes. 
Thus we can recognize those who are aware of new forms and can recognize 
them as soon as they emerge locally, and those who cannot. From the interviews 
we were able to identify answers which could be used to design a cybercrime 
prevention model, also to safeguard bank security. These were “security tips” 
(something similar can be found at Kасперски, 2001, p.5) relevant for business 
mailing systems, with rules of behaviour for employees in circumstances target-
ed by phishers. Some valuable answers were also acquired for mobile telephone 
and IM usage. There were answers combining social networking with previously 
covered fi elds (IM, mobile, prevention in banking). The combined results of the 
survey and interviews prove very useful for wide-ranging possible implementa-
tion, from mobile telephones and computing, to social networking and even 
cloud computing. This is presented in the following fi gure. 
The following characteristics of ID theft can be identifi ed. Two steps are ‘simple’: 
acquiring the data and storing it. Those activities are the most sophisticated and 
constantly evolving, and therefore the most diffi cult to stop. We can therefore 
focus on the motives lying beneath those acts: from the results of our research 
we recognize the following. Firstly, personal use of the data by the perpetrator 
is the rarest of all types. Here we could recognize the perpetrators’ attempts at 
covering their tracks by engaging money mules to do dirty jobs for them. The 
engagement of a middleman ranges from withdrawal of cash from the victim’s 
bank account and online shopping, to concluding transactions in favour of third 
parties. The second motive lies in further commercial use of the obtained data, 
also engaging a middleman (money mule) but this time in favour of a third 
party, not present in the deal. The data will typically be chopped to pieces and 
sold bit-by-bit, since the ID consists of several elements, all of which can be used 
and sold separately. Here we recognize gain in favour of a third party and for the 
benefi t of the perpetrators themselves directly in their bank accounts. The third 
motive lies in creating the possibility for further trade from the data acquired, 
but not all at once. The fourth motive could be defi ned as causing damage to 
other persons.
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Figure 11: Phishing attack vectors
Figure 12: Motives for acquiring and storing the data
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4 CONCLUSION
This paper presents a useful source of information for methods to suppress 
phishing schemes. It explains new forms of cybercrime, with its ever-emerging 
new types and modes, as well as new methods in the social engineering fa-
cilitating it. The understanding of cybercrime among staff in charge of process-
ing crime scene evidence, especially among the police, bank and other fi nancial 
organizations’ personnel, should be of particular interest to forensic specialists 
in their attempts to analyze crime scene behaviour, and the methods used by 
phishers in luring their victims. 
Based on the results obtained in this research, one can visualize the present situ-
ation in Serbia. Various elements of phishing and spear phishing schemes, their 
interdependence, as well as their different manifestation were provided through 
the exploration of expert knowledge and judgement in this specifi c area from 
a wide range of different sectors, such as bank e-security, the police hi-tech 
crime unit, as well as judges and public prosecutors specializing in the fi eld of 
e-crime. 
The results of these interviews clearly indicate that, as far as the behaviour of 
perpetrators is concerned, participants were not so focused on behavioural anal-
ysis, as they were on the phenomenology of the issue. Analysis indicates that 
we can fi nd two types of participants: those who underestimate phishing issues, 
and those who do not. The vast majority of phishing attacks are conducted in 
English language but it is an alarming fact that there are also attacks in the Ser-
bian language. The most valuable fi nding was the existence of spear phishing. 
One can speculate that with the presence of poorly crafted phishing schemes 
in Serbian language (probably made with bots and DDoS attack engines) well-
educated, organized, expert perpetrators could craft attractive spear phishing 
schemes aimed at higher CEOs and other VIPs. These schemes could result in 
various thefts – from digital IDs to well-kept company secrets.
Only 10% of participants did not distinguish spear phishing from classic phishing, 
while the others have different specializations in categorizing modern phishing 
elements. The existence of pharming and spimming attacks in Serbian cyber-
space was very accurately defi ned as a current and rapidly growing problem, 
alongside phishing and spear phishing. All this could be indicative for future 
strategic, tactical, and operational measures by the government and policy mak-
ers. Of course, there must be deeper and thoroughly scientifi c research in this 
area before taking any actions in the fi eld, but hopefully this research could give 
some guidelines for future research. The most interesting fact is that Serbian leg-
islation does not yet specify incriminating acts to cover acts like phishing, spear 
phishing, pharming or spimming (although the last criminal phenomenon could 
theoretically be legally defi ned as attempted fraud, punishable under Section 
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208 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Serbia although not strictly defi ned 
as crime per se). 
One could argue that in a country that has not yet incriminated ID theft (solely 
or as part of phishing crime) we have to consider the implications of this crimi-
nal act very seriously. All research participants suggest that there is awareness of 
ID theft, its motivation, and outer manifestations. The research presented shows 
that this is a new moment for anybody analyzing phishing and other types of ID 
theft in the Serbian cyberspace.
One simple fact shows that a vast majority of the participants (78.6 %) consider 
social networks to be very fruitful surroundings for phishers\ schemes, but 7.2 % 
of the participants fi nd it not as a future, but rather a present space for their ac-
tions. There are 7.1 % of the participants who fi nd Cloud computing to be a more 
realistic virtual space for those actions and more recent cybercrime forms. This 
distribution of survey results shows that the phishers are very seriously present 
in social networking today, but that there are more dangers coming from con-
temporary computing applications on the web1. It also showed that there is a 
very high level of awareness of fraud-related problems in the Serbian cyberspace 
among bank and police staff. The most endangered group for the phishing at-
tacks, as perceived by the percentage of 84.6 % subjects, are bank clients. Higher 
CEOs of the banks and businesses are described as targeted by 7.7 % of the 
participants, and 7.7 % fi nd uneducated persons occupying important positions 
in the state i.e. those who are not familiar with the functioning of false online 
trade, aimed at fraudulently gaining personal and other data for ID theft.
Results from open interviews showed that participants could also be divided into 
categories with respect to their inclination to recognize new forms and types of 
phishing schemes and that here we can see those who are aware of the new 
forms and can recognize them as soon as they emerge locally, and those who 
cannot. 
In recapitulation, we can underline some relations found in this research, be-
tween: the victims’ actions and luring methodology, targeted assets and their 
later use by perpetrators or money mules, defensive actions taken by victim, 
their work position and type of phish, surroundings, the victim`s education and 
type of phish, complexity of the phishing scheme and targets, organized crime 
and realization of phishing schemes.
Phishing and spear phishing are emerging trends in cybercrime in the territory 
of the Republic of Serbia. Most groups that are endangered by this type of cyber-
attacks have some relevant experience in reporting on such activities and their 
prevention, but raising awareness and research studies like this one, conducted 
1 For comparison, look into Athanasopoulos, Makridakis, Antonatos, Antoniades, Ioannidis, Anagno sta kis,
& Markatos, (2008).
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among bank e-security, police hi-tech crime unit, judges and public prosecutors 
from the specialized area of e-crime are the best way to describe the present 
situation and to point out what future trends and arising problems in this fi eld 
are. International cooperation in suppressing cybercrime is of great importance. 
More about this topic can be found in the works of Portnoy and colleagues 
(Portnoy & Goodman, 2009), and Xingan (Xingan, 2010). 
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